random variables with zero means ano constanl u,,. a, vanances U-..
Descriptions of Equations.
The first two equatiors are the detinitioris of money stock and suppiy of reserves The eighth equatior makes depos'tory institu' the monetary base. respect:vely rIle next tnree equat:ons ae tions demand to' borrowed reserves a function of the spread parametric equations relat:ng cu'rency held by the nonbanic pubbetween the Federa: Reserve discount rate amid Inc market in lic. time deposits and excess~eserves to ciockable oeposits and terest rate arid the random error The model is completed oy the market interest rate these equations also contain random including a simpie demand for money equation arid a money components that represent both purely stochastic elem'ierits anc~equilibrium conoition The demand for nominal money is assumec the effects of omitted variab'es me sixth is an dentity remating to depend on nominal income and the rnarke' interest rate.' hf'arequired reserves to total deposits and the seventh is an equiliblion and nence expectations of 'nllation are gnored num condition requiring the demand tor reserves to eoual the 'This borrowing equation difters from the usjal one ihe usua: borow'ng equation would relate borrowing to bank depos:ts paam etricalmy say BA. bD id, This oracticc is riot adopted here For the following reasons F ,rst. tiere is litte theoretcal jusofication for parametr~ca~y relatinq horrow~ng to the leve' of deposits Second. this practice results in including the b-term in tne mu'tplier This ayes the erroneous impression thai the link between money and the base will change with changes ri b even unoer base targeting. ou t this's riot the case. Th,s point wi~i be made clear later in the paper. It .s rue that there would oe some frict,urial leve! of borrowing even if id. Tiua t might Dc appropr,ate to include a constant term in equatton a.
1 hird it is possible to obtain a nonhorrowed reserve multiplier by cornp~ero.yignoring coLlation 2 when the borrowing equation is written ir the above form This encourages one to ignore tne factthat nonhorroweo reserves are linked to money only via their i,nk to the base ortotat reserves 'That is we follow common practice 0 assuming the absence of a 'ntoiiey iliusion on toe pan of money holders of the results presented are derived in the appendix. Nevertheless, the complete model along with a description ofthe equations and variables is presented in table 1 for the reader's convenience, Wherever possible, the analysis is presented graphically.
The model initially assumes CRA. This assumption
will be changed later to analyze the implications of lagged reserve accounting (LRA) for short-run monetary control and to analyze the effects of the Board's proposal for CRA. Initially, the deterministic form of the model is considered. This is achieved by taking the expected value of the endogenous variables (the expected value is denoted with a hat, e.g., E(X) = X). The full model is taken up in the final section, which deals with the variance of money and interest rates under CRA and LRA.
The model requires that three variables be exogenous. Two of the exogenous variables are the discount rate (id~)and nominal income (Ye). The remaining exogenous variable is determined by the operating procedure. If the Federal Reserve chooses to target on the market interest rate (it), it would be treated as exogenoils; in this case, the monetary base (Br) and nonborrowed reserves (NBR 5 ) would change to whatever levels are necessary to achieve the interest rate target. If the Federal Reserve targets on nonborrowed reserves, the monetary base and the interest rate would move endogenously to achieve levels consistent with the nonborrowed reserve target. The same would be true of the interest rate and nonborrowed reserves if the Federal Reserve chose a monetary base target.
Control of the money stock through each of these targets can be analyzed by evaluating the expressions for the expected value of the equilibrium money stock obtained by treating each of these variables as exoge- While these equations appear somewhat complicated, they merely represent expressions for the expected value of the equilibrium money stock, represented graphically by M* in figure 1. For example, both the base and income appear in the equilibrium equation 1, because the money supply is conditional on the level of the base under base targeting and the demand for money is conditional on the income level. This is illustrated in figure la. Therefore, the equilibrium money stock depends both on the level ofincome and the base under a monetary base target.
The discount rate appears in the money stock equation when nonborrowed reserves are exogenous, bitt not when the monetary base is exogenous. The reason for this is simple. Changes in the discount rate alter the spread between it and the market interest rate and, The less interest-sensitive these factors are, the less interest-sensitive will be the money supply. If these factors are completely insensitive to the interest rate, 9 In a recent Board study dealing with the observed historical stability of the monetary base multiplier, David Lindsey and others discuss two types of multiplier endogeneitv. First, they argue that the variability ofthe observed multipliers may he biased downward because they do not account for the possibility that the targeted level of the reserve aggregate may have changed in response to an unanticipated change in some other factor. IL for example, the money supply took an unanticipated jump (hecau.ce ofan unanticip ated jump in the demand lhr money) at the beginning of the intermeeting targeting period, the Federal Reserve might reduce its target for nonborrowed reserves (or the monetary base under base targeting). The result might he a larger observed multiplier if the reduction in the reserve aggregate 'vere larger than the reduction in the money supply fromn its unanticipated level (ofcourse, it could be smaller if the money supply response was greater). This type of reserve aggregate endogcneitv error applies to all potential reserve aggregates, hist only if the Federal Reserve is actually targeting on it. Moreover, this type of reserve endogencity is concerned only with the question of the observed stahilitv of the multiplier; it has nothing to do with the issue ofmonetary control. Since the base is about fi)ur times as large as N'BR, the base multiplier must he about one-fourth as interest-responsive as the NBR multiplier if the money supply' under base targeting is to he less interest-sensitive than under N BR targeting. Whether this condition hnlds dcpcu ds on tIit' rclathc' magu it,ide of tIn' s tn mc-S Iral para net crs as disc' ssm'd above, Figure 2 The Effect of Unanticipated Shifts in Money Demand and Supply n te reS rote money supply, the less responsive the equilibrium money stock will be to unanticipated shifts in money demand. This is illustrated in figure 2a , which shows the effect of an unanticipated increase in the demand for money.
While it is more difficult to ilhistrate, the less interest-sensitive the supply of money, the more sensitive equilibrium money stock may he to unanticipated changes in factors that affect the supply of money. (The exact relationship depends on the relative magnitude of certain parameters of the model.) This is illustrated in figure 2h . An unanticipated decrease, say, in excess reserves, shifts hoth Mb and M'kBfl to the right. Although the latter curve shifts further, the resulting change in the money stock may he smaller. This is the result of the effect of a redtiction in depository institutions' borrowing associated with the declining interest rate on the quantity of money supplied. The above result depends on the source of the supply-side shock. If the supply-side shock comes from an unanticipated change in currency, the effect on the money stock will he larger than if it comes from excess reserves or time
deposits.
The absolute magnitude of' the differential effect of supply-side shocks under'hase and NBR targeting depends on the relative magnitude of the interest sensitivity of borrowing (a) and the demand for money (K). The less interest-sensitive is borrowing and the more interest sensitive the demand for money, the smaller will he this differential effect. If a is sufficiently small relative to A, the money supply would he less responsive to supply-side shocks under base targeting. 12 Given the above analysis, we would expect base 
n/Jogeneity of the Monetary Base
The above analysis explicitly assumes that both nonborrowed reserves and the monetary base can he controlled exogenously at any desired level. This is generally accepted to be true for nonhorrowed reserves, though not for the monetary base. In fact, a principal objection to monetary base targeting is that the monetary base is endogenous. 
In its

This argument is important; however, it has implica-
To this point, the analysis has assumed equation 4, tions for short-run monetary control under both base so the effects of LEA can be seen by substituting equaand nonborrowed reserve targeting. Ifthe target level tion 5 into the model. Tins modification affects the for nonborrowed reserves is inconsistent with deposimodel in two ways: it weakens the contemporaneous tory institutions' required reserves, it produces a short-run change in borrowing, total reserves and, link between the reserve aggregate and the equilibrium money stock, and it makes the model dynamic. 18 hence, money. (7)~-federal hinds rate; however, there is an upper limit to the federal hinds rate that is established by depository institutions' credit demand. These institutions would be unwilling to pay an interest rate on short-term 
The first of these changes can be seen by noting that neither the reserve ratio (r) nor the time deposit ratio (7) appears in the contemporaneous multipliers for the base amid NBR. Indeed, NBR are contemporaneously linked to money, through non-interest-rate effects, only via excess reserves and borrowings. The reserve aggregates provide a link to current money creation primarily through their link to current deposits. LEA severs part of tIns link. (It should be noted, however, that LEA does not eliminate completely the contemporaneous link between the money stock and either reserve aggregate.) t°"
at is sometimes argued that there is no contemporaneous link hetween deposit creation and reserves independent of its effect on market interest rates, l,ecause depusitur~institutions are free to create all the riepusits they wish in this period without any consideration ahoul the current level of reserves (e.g., LeRoy, "Monetan' Control Under Lagged Reserve .kccouuting"). The explicit dynamics of the money stock under LEA are seen by noting that lagged deposits and interest rates are included in the equilibrium money stock equations. NBR and the monetary base not only influence the level of money immediately, but have lagged effects via their influence on deposits and interest rates. These variables, in turn, affect future money. It can he shown that if the dynamic system is stable, the long-run base multiplier is identical to the static base multiplier of equation 1. Thus, if the Federal Reserve were to achieve and maintain some target level of the base, the expected value of the long-run equilibrium money stock would, ceteris parihus, be the same as that obtained under CRA. 2°D
espite the fact that the return to CEA has no consequences for long-run monetary control, it does have some implications for short-run movements in money and interest rates. The following analysis can be carried omit in terms of either base or NBR targeting; however, the results are presented only for base targeting.
The analysis begins with a simple graphic presentation of the model under base targeting in figure 3. Mã nd M~denote the nioney supply schedules under CRA and LEA, respectively. Under fairly reasonable conditions, the money supply schedule is flatter under LEA.
2 ' Again, the money demand equation is drawn for a fixed income level. The curves are drawn to intersect for ease of illustration. The effect of changes in Federal Reserve actions on the money stock can be illustrated via figure 3. For example, suppose that the monetary disturbance comes through an increase in the base. The increase in the base shifts both Mãnd M~to the right. Because the multiplier is larger under LEA than under CRA, the curse shifts further and the new equilibrium level of money is larger.
22 As a result, both the initial increase in the money stock and the initial decrease in the interest rate are larger under LEA.
A difi~rentresult is obtained if the monetary disturbance occurs through a change in the demand for money, as illustrated in figure 4. The increase in the demand for money results in a larger initial increase in the money stock and a smaller initial increase in the interest rate under LEA. Ifall money shocks are associated with changes in money demand due to unanticipated changes in the level ofincome, the move back to CEA would result in less short-run money stock and more interest-rate variability. If all money shocks are associated with changes in the policy control variable, 22 'I'he condition required for the equilihrium money stock to he larger is that
he same condition is required for both base and N BR targeting.
the return to CRA would reduce the short-run variability of both money and interest rates.
In either case, however, the short-run money stock initially overshoots its long-run equilibrium. In the former case, the overshoot is due to the fact that interest rates fall too far in response to an increase in the policy aggregate, while in time latter, it is due to the fact that they do not rise enough in response to an increase in money demand. This initial overshooting of money may have repercussions in subsequent periods as depository' institutions attempt to obtain reserves to support the current overexpansion of deposits. The effect of this dynamic response on the variability of money and interest rates is an empirical question. Furthermore, the curve will shift further than time CRA curve, hut not as far as the LEA for a given change in the monetary base. if most money shocks are associated with changes in the policy control variable, the Federal Reserve's proposal should improve the shortrun stability of both money and interest rates. If most shocks are associated with unanticipated changes in the demand for money, the result will be more stable money and less stable interest rates.
'I'h.e %'~r'4'r'rb"< I;i iivIa','reu (+441. tntevent Rntee nnaer GIRl
Given the above analysis, one might be tempted to conclude that random variations in the factors that affect the money supply will cause both money and interest rates to he more variable under LEA, while random yariations in the demand for money will cause money to be more variable and interest rates to he less variable, Thus, one might suspect that the movement from CEA to LEA would increase the variance of money and may increase the variance of interest rates, depending on the relative magnitudes ofthe variances associated with the factors that affect supply and demand. While the basic intuition that leads to this conclusion is correct, it fails to account for possible Federal Reserve reaction to random changes in time deposits.
Under both CEA and LEA, randoni changes in time deposits, TD, affect the demand for required reserves We have shown that if we accomit for a possible reduction in the variance of interest rates under LEA associated with correctly identifying random changes in time deposits, the variance of interest rates under LEA could he smaller than tinder CEA even if money demand were less variable than the money supply. This conclusion would not hold for the Federal Reserve's proposal, however, since time deposits enter LEA and it in the same way.
Thus, while an analysis of this model suggests that the Federal Reserve's proposal for CEA mnay reduce the variance of money compared with the present system of LEA, its impact on the variance of interest rates is ambiguous. 2°C
:ONCIJIS1ONS
This article reviews tlmree frequently suggested changes in Federal Reserve operating procedures to achieve more stable short-run monetary control: monetary base targeting, tying the discount rate to the market interest rate and adopting a system of contemporaneous reserve accounting.
Since the conditions necessary for money to he exogenous are less restrictive for base than for nonborrowed reserve targeting, adopting a base targeting procedure would likely result in greater short-run monetary control if most of the shocks to the money supply come from the demand side. If most of the shocks come from the supply side, then base targeting~I may result in less stable monetary growth. This conclusion depends critically on the relative interest sensitivity ofthe demand for money and depository institution borrowing. The more interest sensitive is the former and less interest sensitive is the latter, the more stable money growth will be under base targeting relative to NBR targeting. Furthermore, if depository institution borrowing is highly variable, base targeting may be snore stable, even if the shocks come from the supply side, since money will be unresponsive to fluctuations in borrowing under base targeting.
Monetary control under base targeting could be enhanced further by tying the discount rate to a market interest rate. This would reduce substantially the interest sensitivity ofborrowing and make it easier to hit a monetary base target. Adopting a system of contem-AFPE]N DIX poraneous reserve accounting also should make it easier to hit a base target, since it would no longer be necessary for borrowing to respond to differences between a predetermined level of required reserves and an amount of reserves consistent with the base target, as under the present system of LEA.
It is not certain whether the return to a system of contemporaneous reserve accounting on all deposits would increase or reduce the variance of money and interest rates. The Federal Reserve's proposal for contemporaneous reserve accounting, however, will likely reduce the variability ofmonev. Furthermore, it will likely reduce the variability of interest rates, if the variance of the money demand schedule is sufficiently small relative to the variance of the money supply schedule.
The purpose of this appendix is fourfbld. First, it presents the system of reduced-fhrm equations for base and NBR targeting under CRA. Second, it presents the reduced-form equations under LRA. Third, the long-run base multiplier under LEA is derived and discussed. Finally, analytical results for the variance of the endogenous variables fbr base and NBR targeting and for CEA and LEA are presented and discussed. In what fbllows, we will denote the expected value of the variable with a hat, e.g., E(M 1 ) = M.
•The Expected %.:Tcij.,~p 'if I/~(iRedt.iced .~.. 
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This condition will hold if
The term on the right-hand side of this inequality will be positive on the reasonable assumption that X F> p F.
The condition for the change in the money stock under the Federal Reserve's proposal to be less than under (k±eil(1±k) LEA is
The above system based on LRA is dynamic in that
lagged endogenous variables,~--,and~1 --2' appear on the right-hand side of the reduced-form. 2 If we assume, fbr simplicity, that 'V = 0 for all t, then it is easy to shoss' that M 1 can he expressed as the following distributed lag by successive substitution.
i~owifsve let the base he constant fbr all t (i.e., B 1
Using the formula for summing a geometric series, and taking the limit, we have
The sum on the right-hand side of the above equation is finite if p 0~0 as~Under this condition,
Ll-ç slowly or rapidly depending on whether F p is close to one or zero. Furthermore, under the general condition that it < 0, the system will oscillate toward its long-run equilibrium, as indicated by' Laufenberg. The question naturally arises about the variability of the endogenous variables under alternative operating procedures and under different institutional arrangements. Unfortunately, the model does not lead to conclusive answers to these questions. We begin by dealing with the question of the variability of the money stock under base and NBR targeting.
The error terms for the money stock under base and NBR targeting are, respectively:
Substituting in for p, we get
Substituting in fbr~2' we get
Comparing this multiplier with the base multiplier under CRA, we see that they are identical. Thus, LEA makes the system explicitly dynamic hut does not affect the long-run equilihrium.
The above solution, however, does require the stability condition Fp F< 1. The system may convergẽ inciusio,i of i, -, in these equations is based on the assu~nption that changcs in ti,ne deposits in period t -2 induced by changes in the market interest rate affect current required reserves, This is a highly questionable assumption (see below), Thercibre, it ,x,ight he more reasonable to use the reduced-form equations obtained by
If we denote the variance of money under base and NBR targeting by \7(~~) and V(M~), respectively, and if we assume the individual error terms are independent of each other and through time, we get A(e-l) A (li-k) A," -~Fm,, ..,i-u,,)
A number of interesting ohservations can be made from the above. First, random shocks to currency, ut,, move money in opposite directions under base arid NBR targeting if 0 < r(1 -l-T) + e C 1. Under tins condition, a random increase in currency will reduce the money stock under base targeting and increase it under NBR targeting. Furthermore, the magnitude of this shock on the money stock will he larger under base targeting. This can be seen by noting that the absolute value of the coefficient on u~1under base targeting will be larger than under NBE targeting if r(1 + 'r) + e C 1/2 and ifF A 0 FC A 1 L Thus, the variance of money associated with random changes in currency will be larger under base targeting.
The variance ofmoney associated with other supplyside shocks will he smaller under NBR targeting if F, A 0 FC FA 1 F. This condition requires (Xk + p)/(l + k) > a. Standard estimates of these parameters suggest that this condition will hold. Thus, supply-side shocks will have a greater impact on the money supply under base targeting. Note, however, that if the discount rate were tied so that, effectively, a = 0, the above condition would not hold, and more stable monetary control could be achieved through base targeting. Thus, V(M~') C \~(M~). The move from the current system of LEA to the Board's proposed system of CEA should reduce the variance of the money stock. This conclusion is true whether oç is included or excluded from these expressions.
The Varta.'a.cc of tIle lnt:crcst Rate
Denote the variances of the interest rate with respect to CEA, LRA and the Board's proposal as V(i~)and V(ii'), respectively. Then, whether the Board's proposal for CEA will increase or reduce the variability ofinterest rates from the present Following the same procedure as above, it can he system.
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